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This chapter aims at looking at the role of Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
in China’s policy toward Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
in the 21st century, especially since the enlargement of the European Union 
(EU) in 2004. During this time, we could observe an increase of Chinese 
interest in the region resulting in growing trade, investments and number 
of contacts on all levels. China has used a wide array of different instruments 
to achieve its goals in the region: from a big political project such as the “16+1 
format” to an unprecedented frequency of contacts between Chinese 
provinces and their European counterparts (Kaczmarski, Jakóbowski 
2015). Despite a visible growth of economic ties, Beijing presented a very 
limited will to use investments as a political instrument. Even if Chinese 
investments in CEE are booming, they are possibly less politically biased 
and more market-driven than those in other developing countries, like 
African ones.
The Chinese investment pattern is also different than in the old EU member 
states (EU-15). Although, similarly to the Western Europe, China’s strategy 
mainly involves purchasing existing companies, rather than making large 
greenfield investments (Jakóbowski 2015), Chinese foreign direct investments 
(FDI) are more greenfield than merger and acquisition (M&A)-oriented. Also 
strategic alliances have been much rarer in CEE than in the EU-15. Jacoby 
(2014) claims that this may prove that the Chinese in CEE are motivated 
more often by market access and less often by gaining access to technology 
and management practices, both of which are more available through M&A 
and/or strategic alliances with local firms. Such an approach of the Chinese 
could explain the very limited engagement of SWFs, which obviously 
are not interested in greenfield investments. This, however, raises the question 
about the role of the Chinese SWFs in CEE? Are they going to increase their 
engagement in the region together with maturing economic ties between 
China and the region? Could they serve as a convenient instrument of political 
pressure on CEE countries?
This chapter starts with an overview of Chinese policy toward CEE, its 
motivations, goals and methods. Then Chinese SWFs investments in CEE 
are presented against a background of their activities in the whole EU 
and the fact, that they are perceived as politically-biased. At the end, an analysis 
of the potential role of Chinese SWFs in the region and the risks linked 
with it is conducted.
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5.1. Background of China-CEEC relations 
While China traditionally has had friendly relations with Central and Eastern 
European countries, dating back to the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949, they were highly dependent on the overall state of China-
Soviet relations. This resulted in almost three decades of practically frozen 
cooperation after a period of intensified and comprehensive relations during 
the 1950s. This fact, as well as internal difficulties in China, i.e. the Cultural 
Revolution, meant that the full potential of China-CEE relations could not be 
realized during the Cold War period. On the Chinese side, this historical legacy 
was also visible in the fact that CEE affairs were treated by state agencies together 
with Soviet issues, and geographically put together as Eurasian Affairs.
The end of the Cold War, the democratization and economic transformation 
of CEE countries opened new chapter in China’s relations with the region. 
Unfortunately, the abovementioned processes coincided with internal 
problems in China. 9 June 1989 became a symbol in this matter, as it marked 
the subversion of the student protest in Tiananmen Square and the first semi-
free parliamentary elections in Poland since World War Two. Although mutual 
interest did not disappear completely, the period immediately after 1989 was 
marked by a lack of trust between China and the newly democratized Central 
European countries.
China first tried to build its position in the region in the 1990s, 
but at that time cooperation with China was often used in internal political 
disputes. Many former democratic opposition members in CEE countries 
criticized, on moral grounds, post-Communist politicians who at that time 
were more eager to develop friendly relations with Beijing. On the other hand, 
one has to remember that in the last decade of the 20th century both sides had 
other political priorities than the development of China-CEE relations. Notably, 
in the CEE countries it was the EU and NATO accession that occupied their 
minds and used resources. Economically, both China and Central European 
countries were westwards oriented, and therefore generally did not perceive 
each other as attractive partners. Moreover, to a certain extent they became 
competitors among emerging markets (Zhu 2012).
It was not until the beginning of 21st century that China changed its 
perception of Central Europe. The EU enlargement in 2004 and the Eurozone 
crisis became major factors behind the change. The importance of the EU 
enlargement in 2004 for China-Central Europe relations rested both on Chinese 
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recognition of the positive impact of the process, and on the Central European 
countries’ realization of strategic diplomatic goals regarding their entrance 
into the EU and NATO. This new situation opened space for cooperation 
as the new EU members had more resources to develop relations with more 
distant countries, and the economic benefits of EU membership brought new 
opportunities for cooperation with China. A report by the renowned China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations published in November 
2003 clearly stresses respect for the political choices made by CEE countries, 
acknowledging as well that both sides politically will not be strategic partners 
for each other (CICIR 2003). From this point CEE countries were also firmly 
treated by China as part of Europe (as opposed to Eurasia during the Cold War), 
and a new channel for conducting relations with them was opened. On the other 
hand, at that point China seemed to not have a specific policy for dealing 
with the whole region, although intensified interest was clearly visible.
It was only by the end of the decade that the second of the abovementioned 
factors took into effect. As states whose development are dependent on foreign 
investments and export, after 2008 CEE countries started to look for new 
markets and sources of capital. This new situation was also reflected in their 
stance on issues regarding EU-China relations, in general, they became more 
positive toward loosening protectionist measures (Cui 2013). By that time, 
China was also experiencing new challenges in its development strategy, as well 
as political relations with its neighbors. All this prompted China to develop 
a more structuralized approach to CEE, seen in Beijing as an area of new 
opportunity.
In the period after the first CEE countries entered the EU, economic and trade 
cooperation of the 16 CEE countries with China sped up, with the trade volume 
growing from USD 8.7 billion in 2003 to USD 55.1 billion in 2013. China’s 
investment in CEEC1 increased from less than 100 million USD to about 
5 billion USD. CEE investment in China grew from USD 420 million to USD 
1.2 billion (MoC PRC 2014). However, due to lack of reliable statistical data2, 
1  China treats the following 16 countries as Central and Eastern Europe: Albania, 
Bosnia and  Hercegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia.
2  „Measurements of  the  flow of  China’s foreign direct investments are  severely 
hampered by the significant involvement of offshore financial centres in these 
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estimations can noticeably differ in terms of actual size of Chinese investments 
(Jakóbowski 2015)
Although the overall volume of trade, investment as well as rapidly 
growing contacts, it is asymmetry that defines China-CEE relations. On one 
hand, it is trade asymmetry, as China became a major import partner 
for CEE countries, but one with which they have a huge trade imbalance. 
Although it has to be taken into consideration that after 2004, as CEE has 
been integrated with the global value chains of multinational firms that have 
also been developing rapidly in China as well, trade deficit with China is also 
linked with the transfer of productive factors within the mentioned chains. 
Nevertheless, trade deficit is often raised by CEE countries during high level 
political talks. Apart from economic issues, asymmetry is also clearly visible 
when it comes to overall potential of the interested countries. It can also be 
observed within CEE itself, where Poland is by far the largest country, and all 
four Visegrad Group countries dominate the rest (Kong 2014).
5.2. Goals of Chinese policy toward Central Europe 
China’s policy toward CEE needs to be put into a broader context of overall 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy, with serving national development 
of China as its main task since 1978. One of the major means of it was 
to forge strong links with the world economy as the internationalization 
of Chinese economy was seen as the key to the revival of China’s position 
in international relations. While the “Go Out” strategy (more commonly 
known in the West as “Going Global”) became part of the 10th Five-Year Plan 
(2000–2005) in 2001, it was not until the mid-2000s that Chinese companies, 
organizations and localities began to follow the government’s encouragement 
to internationalize, whilst intensifying soft power initiatives (Shambaugh 2013). 
This was also evident in the rising interest in CEE that followed general trends 
of Chinese politics and economy, as it was not until the 11th plan for 2006–2010 
that China’s investment began to rise in CEE. At that time Chinese investors 
began to realize the investment potential of the region that was further 
type of transactions, by cases of by-passing administrative restrictions imposed 
on  capital flows using unofficial channels, and  by  deficiencies in  statistical 
methodologies used” (Jakóbowski 2015).
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strengthened by economic problems in the Eurozone. In terms of investment 
opportunities some observers in China began to use the term “window 
of opportunity” (Liu 2013).
More recent initiatives also seem to follow the common pattern. Since 
2013 the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping started to actively promote 
the creation of “the Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road” (often described as “One Belt, One Road”) that would help 
in economic policy coordination, building transport links, free trade, use 
of local currencies and friendly people-to-people relations. These proposals, 
while targeted at foreign partners essentially seem to address the need 
for a change of the Chinese economic growth model and the development 
of Western China. Given their location, CEE countries can play an important 
role since the overland routes pass through Poland, while the maritime route 
from the Greek port of Piraeus could take a land passage through the Balkans 
and Hungary. Moreover, the areas of cooperation preferred by CEE countries, 
especially infrastructure development, are also priorities of the One Belt, One 
Road strategy (Liu 2014a). The role of CEE countries in the Silk Road Economic 
Belt is still being discussed, but it is already clear that at least for CEE many 
proposals were planned and announced much earlier and are being put into 
the Silk Road framework ex post (Li, Zhou 2014).
Politically, CEE’s role for Chinese foreign policy increased after 
the enlargement of the EU. Already in June 2004 during a state visit to Poland, 
Hungary and Romania Hu Jintao acknowledged the need to strengthen political 
dialogue and cooperation with new or soon to be EU members, as these 
countries by being part of the EU will have influence over issues all around 
the world (Zhu 2012). This is especially true for the Visegrad Group members, 
as it has been noticed in China that they possess “an intra-European Union 
voting weight equal to France and Germany combined” (Liu 2014). It also has 
to be noted that during the Crimean crisis in March 2014, Chinese foreign 
minister has a telephone consultation with his Polish counterpart.
To sum up, China’s actions in CEE are motivated by the national development 
of China. Because of this the goals set for Chinese policy reflect the current 
stage of domestic reforms as well as broader international initiatives. Therefore, 
in recent years the discussed countries started being considered as an entry 
point for Chinese investment in Europe and simultaneously a passage area 
on routes from China to Western Europe, both needed for the outward 
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movement of Chinese companies. Apart from direct effects visible in bilateral 
relations, the indirect influence on EU policy toward China can also be traced 
back in China-CEE interactions.
According to Chinese sources pragmatism, defined by the Chinese as focus 
on economic cooperation beneficial to all parties (often described in official 
documents as a “win-win situation”) is the main point of Chinese policy toward 
Central Europe, while risk avoidance and adhering to market rules are guiding 
principles (Liu 2013). Therefore, China looks for stable and predictable partners 
for cooperation. The size of the economy and overall potential also seem 
to play an important role. Very informative in this matter is a look at the “The 
rank and rating of CEECs’ investment environment” prepared at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, a leading Chinese think tank that also deals 
with the CEE issues (Table 5.1)3. Described as a “new designed framework 
for investment environment indicators from Chinese perspective” (Liu 2014) 
it emphasizes China’s specific requirements and investment preferences, notably 
weighing political factors highly (especially bilateral relations).
Comparing China’s relations with Hungary and Poland present an interesting 
case when it comes to political factors in Chinese considerations. Hungary has 
a long history of good relations with China, even in the 1990s the government 
was more open to cooperation with China, than in the neighboring countries, 
and is also home to the largest Chinese community in Central Europe. 
Especially since 2003 Hungarian authorities actively seek to enhance their 
relations with China and with the Viktor Orban coming to power in 2010 
these were further intensified. Hungary was willing to become not only 
a Chinese economic hub in the region but also explored possibilities of very 
close comprehensive cooperation that to a certain extent could counterweight 
strained relations with Brussels. Poland on the contrary, was not only politically 
very distant from China, often bringing up issues sensitive to Beijing i.e. Tibet, 
but also relatively protectionist in economic matters as well (Fox, Godement 
2009). Nevertheless, it was Poland that has practically been chosen as the most 
important partner which was evidenced by both the signing of strategic 
3  Since the  time of  writing this book the  position of  some of  the  countries has 
most probably changed, i.e. the Czech Republic might have overtaken Hungary 
after the  President of  the  Czech Republic Milos Zeman’s state visit to  China 
in  November 2014, which will possibly give rise to  a  relatively low mark 
for bilateral relations. 
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partnership in 2011, as well as hosting the first China-CEE Cooperation Forum 
in Warsaw, 2012.
China chose Poland due to the size of its economy, good conditions 
during the Eurozone crisis and political stability. All of these mentioned 
elements helped to strengthen Poland’s role in the EU as well, a fact that was 
not insignificant for China. Hungary under President Orban was perceived 
as too uncertain, both economically and politically, to become a strategic 
partner. Specifically, relations between the Hungarian government and EU 
institutions could potentially put at risk Chinese interests. Internal difficulties 
in administrative coordination also might have played a role (Kałan 2012).
5.2.1. European and regional look (16+1 format) 
Apart from the abovementioned focus on economic cooperation, 
pragmatism as understood by China is also a combination of the “European 
point of view” (Ouzhou shijiao) and “Central and Eastern Europe regional 
pattern” (Zhongdongou diqu fangshi). The former refers to the already mentioned 
acknowledgement of CEE orientation in the EU, and the subsequent treatment 
of this region by Beijing as part of its broader European policy. The latter is more 
often described in the West as the “16+1 format” according to which China 
is willing to conduct its relations together with the 16 CEE countries. By doing 
so China shows that CEE countries are not only considered part of Europe, 
but a part of Europe that deserves special attention so that Chinese policies 
and initiatives could catch up with those developed earlier with other parts 
of the EU (Scandinavia, West and South Europe). It also appears that China 
realizes that those among the 16 CEE countries that are currently not part 
of the EU eventually will become members, or at least there policies will 
continue to be Brussels oriented.
The “16+1 format” deserves special attention as it became the first 
comprehensive Chinese strategy aimed at all of the countries in that the region. 
The first signs of China’s new approach and introduction of the “16+1 format” 
could be observed in June 2011 when the China-Central and Eastern European 
Countries Economic and Trade Forum was organized in Budapest. During 
the event the former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made five proposals 
on increasing bilateral trade, increasing two-way investments, enhancing 
infrastructure construction cooperation, deepening fiscal and financial 
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cooperation, as well as expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges. 
Although the Premier opened the Budapest event personally, it was not until 
2012 in Warsaw that it took the form of a summit attended by the heads 
of government. At that point it was already clear that China had chosen the so-
called “16+1” format when dealing with the region.
In 2012 original proposals made by Wen in Budapest were developed into 
the so-called 12 cooperation measures for China-Central Europe cooperation. 
This list of initiatives, mostly in the economic sphere, was to put a new 
dynamic in it. Among them were pledges to open a USD 10 billion credit 
line for cooperation projects as well as a USD 500 million investment fund. 
It is important to note that the measures were formally a one-side declaration 
by China, and while welcomed by the 16 countries, they did not fully reflect 
their expectations. This divergence became evident soon after the meeting 
as more details were disclosed. And only were some of the proposed 
measures not attractive for a few countries (notably the EU members who 
were not allowed to provide special treatment for Chinese companies), 
but the overall development raised concerns in Brussels that the new initiative 
was undermining EU’s policy toward China.
The new Chinese Premier Li Keqiang confirmed the previously taken path 
in Bucharest, in November 2013. At the meeting, “The Bucharest Guidelines 
for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries” 
were signed by all 17 parties and proposals of both China and CEE countries 
were put on agenda. This shows that the new platform improved and used 
the experiences of the previous year, as well as the fact that it is also used 
for bilateral relations between individual states and China. The guidelines, apart 
from outlining several specific initiatives to be taken up during 2014, focused 
on creating joint mechanisms of cooperation in particular fields and further 
learning about possible cooperation and expectations. Out of 8 points, 6 were 
related to the economic sphere. The guidelines also addressed concerns related 
to the EU by committing to follow EU law.
It was also in 2014 that one of the proposals raised by Wen Jiabao in Warsaw, 
namely the establishment of the China-CEE Investment Cooperation 
Fund with the initial capital of USD 500 million, was finalized. The Fund 
was eventually established by China Exim Bank in partnership with other 
institutional investors from CEE, and Warsaw based CEE-Equity Partners 
Ltd became the investment advisor. It is interested in projects typically 
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requiring USD 25–75 million of equity with larger transactions also financed 
with partners or with bank debt. The first investment was announced 
in September 2014 and together with two partners was aimed at three wind 
power projects in Poland (CEE Equity Partners).
In December 2014 the third meeting took place in Belgrade. Like 
in Bucharest, the meeting resulted in signing the Belgrade guidelines 
for cooperation. Further developing ideas announced a year before, economy 
still dominated with improving connectivity and logistics on top of the list. This, 
together with the declaration that a medium-term cooperation agenda will be 
discussed in 2015 showed that the format is evolving into a more matured form, 
with a growing number of common initiatives (Belgrade Guidelines 2014). 
Apart from the guidelines, Premier Li Keqiang pledged that China will establish 
a new investment fund worth USD 3 billion, that will take advantage of public-
private partnerships and leasing, forms of investment that CEE countries seek 
but are not so appealing to China (Tanjug 2014a). “Despite the general success 
of the Meeting, there were setbacks as well. The signing of the two agreements 
on HSR [Belgrade-Budapest High-Speed Railway] appear to be a face-saving 
exercise: the final contract – previously expected to be signed in Belgrade 
– did not materialize since the involved parties could not reach an agreement 
on the modality of financing” (Pavlićević 2014).
In general, the “16+1 format” was also seen in China as a means toward 
overcoming the asymmetry problem by conducting relations with a single 
bloc. The problem is that while China treats these 16 countries together, those 
countries do not constitute a unified group. Moreover, even in their relations 
with China under the “16+1 format” these countries perceive each other rather 
as competitors for Chinese investment and business opportunities. Even 
with mechanism developed in 2014 “there is also reluctance to institutionalize 
the 16+1 format. For CEE, it is 16 bilateral dialogues, while new mechanisms 
are instruments facilitating contacts rather than institutions, as they do not have 
internal structure or budget” (Szczudlik-Tatar 2014). The Chinese are already 
aware of the fact that because of the differences among the 16 countries future 
relations would be more like “one country toward many sides” (yiguo dui 
duobian) rather than one country toward a single bloc (Liu 2013).
It also appears that a very important part of the “16+1 format” was policy 
coordination on the Chinese side. In 2012 the Secretariat for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries was established 
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in Beijing4. It is “mainly responsible for coordinating Chinese institutions, 
implementing the outcome of the leaders’ meeting through the collaboration 
with the authorities of the 16 CEE countries, planning key directions 
and priorities for future cooperation between China and CEE countries, 
and organizing and promoting the work of the Secretariat.” The creation of such 
a body not only helped in the abovementioned areas but also gave a clear sign 
to central government ministries and agencies, local governments and state 
owned companies that development of relations with CEE partners is accepted 
by the highest authorities.
It has to be mentioned that cooperation is not only conducted on the central 
level as Chinese local governments are also playing an increasingly important 
role. Interestingly their behavior often follow the patterns of relations 
on the central level (i.e. they initiate projects that Central European partners 
respond to). The “16+1 format” has been used at this level as well, notably 
with the Local Leaders Forum organized in Chongqing and Prague. Relations 
between cities, CEE regions and China are a fast growing phenomenon but their 
potential has not been yet fully realized.
The “16+1 format” did raise suspicion in Brussels though, with the EU 
worrying that China wants to divide its members. It seems that, among others, 
it was a matter of communication as after the initial discussions on that issue 
in 2012 it appears to have been solved. Both Bucharest and Belgrade guidelines 
addressed this issue explicitly by both declaring that the cooperation 
is contributing to the EU-China partnership, and in the case of EU members 
it will be conducted with respect to EU laws and regulations. In Belgrade 
Premier Li Keqiang specifically mentioned that “China supports the European 
4  The  Secretariat consists of  18 member units and  they are: the  Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs; International Liaison Department of the Central Committee 
of  the  Communist Party of  China; National Development and  Reform 
Commission; Ministry of  Education; Ministry of  Science and  Technology; 
Ministry of  Finance; Ministry of  Transport (including National Railway 
Administration); Ministry of  Agriculture; Ministry of  Commerce; Ministry 
of  Culture; People’s Bank; General Administration of  Press and  Publication, 
Radio, Film and  Television; National Tourism Administration; Civil Aviation 
Administration; Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China; 
Council for  the  Promotion of  International Trade; Development Bank; 
and  Export-Import Bank. The  Secretariat office is  located in  the  department 
of European Affairs of China’s Foreign Ministry to handle daily affairs.
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integration process,” “China’s cooperation with the 16 CEECs will not result 
in fragmenting the European Union […] it will help deepen cooperation 
between China and the European Union,” and “China-CEEC cooperation 
is undoubtedly part and parcel of China-Europe cooperation, and the two could 
naturally go in parallel and be mutually reinforcing” (Tanjug 2014b).
Addressing the needs brought up by CEECs, China has already announced 
a series of measures to facilitate trade relations with the region i.e. the hosting 
of round table meetings with commerce ministers, exhibition CEE products 
in China and running of an agricultural and trade forum. However, these 
kind of actions will take some time to bear fruit, reflecting the issue of trade 
imbalances brought by the CEE countries.
* * *
After a period of mutual disengagement, the EU Eastwards expansion 
as well the Eurozone crisis opened new perspectives for China-CEE relations 
that resulted in high dynamics of cooperation. A gradual and rather cautious 
Chinese policy, meant to learn the new situation and explore opportunities, has 
been the major factor of the change. China had the initiating role, including 
decisions on key partners and methods (16+1) with CEECs initially only 
responding to it, and then gradually putting forward their own proposals. 
The “16+1 format” revealed more structured approach to the region, being 
firmly a part of broader European policy.
Consequently, especially since 2011, Central Europe has experienced China’s 
comprehensive offensive into the region. It was focused mainly on the Visegrad 
Group members, Romania and Serbia, with economic cooperation being 
the major area of interaction and political and public diplomacy aspects playing 
a supportive role. It has to be stressed though that China’s internal development 
plays an important role as well, which is also clearly visible in new Chinese 
proposals like the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road. It is yet hard to decide on the effects of Chinese policy toward the region, 
mostly because at the time of writing this piece there were few examples 
of visible impact. However, expectations, especially on the side of the new export 
market and investment seeking CEECs, are high.
Finally, a particular aspect of Chinese policy toward CEECs should also be 
noted. One can argue that better mutual understanding can also be an important 
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goal of the policy. Given the fact that for many years there have been very 
little working level contacts, and the general understanding expectations 
is low, then this could have a profound impact on China’s policy in the future. 
Special coordination mechanisms for Chinese institutions engaged in contacts 
with CEECs, as well as sectorial China-CEEC cooperation mechanisms 
that follow the “16+1 format” bring forward some new potential for development.
5.3. Chinese SWFs’ investments in Europe 
The People’s Republic of China has several public investment vehicles 
but among them two major SWFs can be indicated. The first is China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) formally established in September 2007 
to manage and diversify Chinese foreign exchange reserves beyond its 
traditional investments in dollar-denominated bonds. This is a flagship fund, 
officially acknowledged as a SWF. The second is SAFE Investment Company 
(SIC), a Hong Kong based subsidiary of the State Administration for Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE). This institution is primarily responsible for the management 
of Chinese foreign exchange. On the contrary to CIC, SIC is much more 
obscure, and China has repeatedly refused to acknowledge its existence until 
it was confronted with incontrovertible evidence collected amid a media probe 
in 2008 (Anderlini 2008). Both funds have a total of USD 1.2 trillion under 
management (SWF Institute 2014).
The characteristics of investment patterns and performance of the two 
largest Chinese SWFs indicate that they are tools of the state’s “Go Global” 
strategy and the politics of maintaining raw materials and energy security. 
Through SWFs, China invests in projects related to its political goals (Norris 
2016; Cieślik 2014). Therefore, they are widely viewed as highly politicized 
and run in an obscure fashion, which has triggered a debate in Western 
countries as to whether the SWFs might serve as a source of market stability 
or as a potential threat to Europe (Bu 2010).
The debate about these SWFs has been echoed in a wider debate on rising 
Chinese investment and its potential consequences for the European Union. 
The problem has attracted the attention of business consultants (Hanemann, 
Rosen 2012) as well as academics (Meunier 2014; Zhang, v.d. Buckle 2014) 
and finally politicians – e.g. research studies on this topic have been ordered 
by the European Commission (Apoteker 2012; Clegg, Voss 2012). The majority 
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of voices in the debate sounds rather soothing. Despite growing concerns among 
EU member states over the rising Chinese presence in Europe, there is no 
evidence that it threatens security in any way. Chinese investments activities 
are still limited in number and value and have a rather positive (if any) influence 
on the European economy and markets (Kamiński 2014).
As far as SWF investments in the EU are concerned, it is noticeable that their 
value has also remained rather low. After a buying spree in 2008 when China 
snapped up USD 8.4 billion worth of European “troubled assets,” annual 
exposure in the subsequent years has hovered below USD 5 billion (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1. The value of Chinese SWF investments in the EU in 2007–2013 (in USD million) 
Source: own calculations based on SWF Institute Transaction Database and SWF Center Transaction 
Database [accessed: 20.08.2014].
The value seems particularly unassuming, relative to the size of all SWF 
investments allocated to Europe. From 2007 to August 2014 they have totaled 
approximately USD 248 billion. This is significant if compared to other 
alternative investors (e.g. private equity funds whose routine investment strategy 
also involves acquisitions of shares or stakes in companies). Private equity 
vehicles allocated about USD 401 billion in 2007–2013 (EVCA Yearbook 2013). 
Chinese funds, with slightly more than USD 29 billion, are responsible for less 
than 12% of the value of SWF investments, on a par with Singapore (about USD 
33 billion) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (about USD 29 billion).
As shown in Table 5.2, the United Kingdom (UK) attracted more than 
60% of Chinese SWF investments. When combined with France, we see 
 
Fig. 1 
 1 048,59  
 8 448,89  
 3 133,53  
 3 410,44  
 4 835,86  
 3 524,28  
 3 909,39  
 -
 1 000,00
 2 000,00
 3 000,00
 4 000,00
 5 000,00
 6 000,00
 7 000,00
 8 000,00
 9 000,00
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
84
Tomasz Kamiński, Tomasz Jurczyk
the vast majority (more than 90%) of SWF activity revolves around those 
two economies. Interestingly, Germany has managed to lure a relatively puny 
proportion of Chinese SWF commitments, given its undisputable status 
as the most powerful economy in Europe. Perhaps it is due to the relatively 
lukewarm approach to SWFs adopted so far by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
cabinet. In 2009, Germany passed a law authorizing the government to bar non-
EU investments in German companies greater than 25% if deemed a “public 
order and security” risk (Chaisse 2012). Although this regulation is broadly 
in line with similar rules already in force in the UK and France – Germany 
enacted it in a knee-jerk reaction to the rapid proliferation of SWFs.
Table 5.2. Chinese SWFs’ investments in the EU member states (2007–Aug 
2014) USD million
Country Value Share in total
UK 18,905.08 64.00%
Netherlands 1,517.88 5.14%
Germany 484.97 1.64%
France 8,391.75 28.41%
Other states 241.15 0.82%
Total 29,540.83 100.00%
Source: own calculations based on SWF Institute Transaction Database and SWF Center 
Transaction Database [accessed: 20.08.2014].
Due to the limited magnitude of Chinese SWF investments in comparison 
with all SWF acquisitions undertaken so far in the EU, the resultant share 
in the overall SWF portfolio allocated to Europe has remained low. In none 
of the member states, except for France, China has ranked as a major SWF 
investor (Table 5.2).
Chinese SWFs invest in Europe directly or  through subsidiaries 
(sometimes in the form of Special Purposes Vehicles). For example, CIC has 
set up subsidiaries such as Best Investment Corporation or Stable Investment 
Corporation. Behind some of SAFE’s investments in Europe stands Gingko 
Tree Investment Ltd. a subsidiary specializing in real estate acquisitions 
and registered in London. However, Gingko does not always invest directly, 
moving to set up its own subsidiaries. Such a practice makes monitoring 
Chinese SWF investments a highly complex effort (MacMahon, Wei 2013).
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Table 5.3. Chinese SWF investments in EU member states in comparison 
with all SWF investments (2007–Aug 2014) in USD million
Country All SWFs China Chinese share
UK 11,9202.5 18,905.08 15.86%
Spain 16,416.48 0.00 0.00%
Netherlands 9,489.79 1,517.88 15.99%
Italy 10,232.17 0.00 0.00%
Germany 50,661.46 484.97 0.96%
France 28,142.72 8391.75 29.82%
Others 14,047.96 241.15 1.72%
Total 248,193.08 29,540.83 11.90%
Source: own calculations based on SWF Institute Transaction Database and SWF Center 
Transaction Database [accessed: 20.08.2014].
There is obviously a question to what extent are Chinese investment 
activities subordinated to a state’s foreign policy goals. Academics tend to agree 
that the link between Chinese outward investments and the political objectives 
is close and that Chinese companies are often instruments used to implement 
Beijing’s foreign policy (Norris 2016; Pietrasiak et al. 2014; Freeman 2013). 
The best examples are large infrastructure projects that are included in Chinese 
foreign aid in third world countries. They are usually financed by Chinese banks 
and constructed by Chinese companies.
However, the aforementioned studies on Chinese investment in Europe seem 
to demonstrate that, so far, their political dimension has not been significant 
and none of the EU countries is seen as being “in China’s pocket.” Primarily, 
the scale of Chinese investment in Europe is still rather limited. Even if 
the growth of the volume of Chinese investment might be impressive, the share 
of Chinese firms in the European market remains marginal. Obviously, if 
the rapid growth of the investments turns out to be sustainable, the political 
pressure on Europe will grow.
5.4. Chinese SWFs in CEEC and potential 
methods of their political use 
As far as CEE is concerned, very little is known about the Chinese SWF 
investments in those countries. There were a few official announcements 
and declaration of interests, but not many transactions materialized. For example, 
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according to Reuters (2012) CIC has signed a deal with Poland’s investment body, 
the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ), that could 
see China’s SWF snap up assets in the coming years. “As for the size of their 
investments, the sky is the limit,” PAIiIZ chief Slawomir Majman commented 
to Reuters. But two years later, in November 2014, according to a PAIiIZ 
official communicate on the website, a CIC representative stated that they had 
only “explored” the potential of Poland during his meeting with Mr Majman. 
Hitherto, there has been no single CIC acquisition in Poland revealed, however, 
Gao Xiqing, the former president of CIC, admitted in May 2013 that the fund had 
already invested around USD 1 billion in Polish listed companies (Rożyński 2013). 
The executive did not give any more precise data concerning these investments 
and this information has not been confirmed by other sources.
The largest transaction in CEE, with participation of a Chinese SWF, was 
the sale of the Silesia City Center shopping mall in southern Poland’s industrial 
city of Katowice for EUR 412 million. It was bought by a consortium headed 
by Germany’s Allianz Real Estate, which also includes Chinese Gingko, 
the subsidiary of Chinese SAFE (Property Investor Europe 2015; Cienski 2014).
Even if we do not know the exact value of Chinese SWF investments in CEE, 
we can estimate that it is low in comparison to Western Europe. The whole region 
has not managed to attract much Chinese money, even if particular countries 
have tried. Apart from the already mentioned case of Poland, a Czech minister 
has also met with the head of the CIC (Richter 2014) but with no effect so far.
This situation can change in the near future. CIC, or precisely its subsidiary 
CIC Capital, may have received USD 100 billion from a Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) bond issued in part for overseas direct investment in the framework 
of the One Belt, One Road initiative (Hsu 2015). CEECs are an important 
part of this Chinese program and due to this fact may attract some SWFs 
investments.
Even if until now the Chinese SWFs investments in CEE are not significant 
in terms of value, we could easily point out at least four methods of potential 
political usage of SWFs in the future. First of all, China could directly exploit 
its SWFs in so-called “chequebook diplomacy,” aiming at pressuring a CEEC 
to behave in a way that is in line with Chinese interests. As Costa Rica’s case has 
shown, described in Chapter 2, China is able to use its foreign exchange reserves 
to reach political goals. Small countries of CEE are particularly vulnerable 
to such a pressure.
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Secondly, China could pressure CEE countries with  the  threats 
of disinvestment from the region. Due to the fact, that real value of SWFs pocket 
investments are not really known, Beijing could politically use this method even 
without great financial involvement. The announcement of disinvestment, 
refraining from investing in CEE or simply a lack of confidence in CEE markets, 
could entail great financial losses. Therefore, governments could be vulnerable 
to pressures from the Chinese side.
Thirdly, Chinese SWFs could take stakes in companies that are strategically 
important for the CEE states. Even if unable to control them, they could have 
enough shares to install their representatives on boards. That would give 
them an opportunity to have access to company secrets. Those secrets could 
then be passed on to Chinese competitors or used in any other way in line 
with the Chinas’s interests.
Finally, SWFs could be valuable tool in building a positive image of China. 
For the purposes of public diplomacy, it is very profitable to present China 
as an engaged and responsible investor, ready to salvage in case of crisis 
(Godemont, Parello-Plesner 2011). The above mentioned, unverifiable claims 
of Gao Xiqing about the USD 1 billion investment in Poland could serve 
as a good example of such a behavior.
Conclusions 
Central and Eastern Europe is playing a more and more important role 
in Chinese policy. After decades of a mutual lack of interest, as well as lack 
of trust, China-CEEC relations have not only seen increased and deepened 
contacts, but also institutionalization and development of new cooperation 
formats. However, the relative novelty, as well as high dynamics in the creation 
of new initiatives, make it hard to provide any final judgments. Trends seem 
to be undisputable, but the mentioned deficits in knowledge and experience 
result in policies not always suitable for particular countries. It has to be 
mentioned though, that Chinese decision makers already started to take into 
consideration the variety of conditions in all 16 CEECs.
Beijing tries to use a variety of political instruments to reach their goals 
in CEE. Until now, the state’s capital pooled in SWFs belongs to the group 
of the tools that are not frequently used in the region. However, assets 
of Chinese SWFs are rising and one can expect that in future they will more 
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often explore investment opportunities in CEECs. Increased engagement 
in the region gives China a convenient instrument of political pressure 
on the states in the region. That is going to be a great challenge for CEE 
governments due to the fact that today it is in principle impossible to close 
the doors on the capital market for Chinese funds. Their money is needed 
and their long term investment perspective can serve as a stabilizer 
for unstable stock exchanges and provide them with the necessary liquidity. 
On the other hand, so long as it is the state’s capital one has to remember 
that behind this capital stands a powerful country with its interests 
and ambitions.
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